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Freedman: Client-Centered Lawyering-What it Isn't

CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERINGWHAT IT ISN'T
Monroe H. Freedman*
Several years ago, I happened to sit in on part of a colleague's class
in family law. The professor showed clips from Kramer vs. Kramer, a
movie involving a custody litigation between the divorced mother and
father of a young child, whom both of them love.1 At the outset, the
lawyer tells his client, the father, "I'll have to play rough," but he
provides no explanation of what that means.2 Later, after the lawyer
conducts a cruel cross-examination of the mother, the client first begins
to understand, and says, "Did you have to be so rough on her?"3 The
lawyer's only response is, "Do you want the kid or don't you?",4 The
lawyer at no time makes any effort to counsel the client about the nature
of hard-fought custody litigation, to suggest either an effort at
conciliation with the mother or an amicable arrangement for sharing time
with the child, or to seek out the client's true feelings and desires about
possible courses of action.5
"That is client-centered lawyering, which is favored by my
colleague, Professor Freedman," the professor said disapprovingly.6
I explained to my colleague that he had seriously misrepresented
client-centered lawyering, and suggested that he read what I had actually
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center; Author, UnderstandingLawyers' Ethics (4th ed. 2010) (with
Abbe Smith).
1. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Although my colleague was wrong in his understanding of what client-centered lawyering
is, he was correct that my philosophy of law is client-centered. As Abbe Smith and I say in the
Preface to UnderstandingLawyers' Ethics: "This book presents a systematic position on lawyers'
ethics. We argue that lawyers' ethics is rooted in the Bill of Rights and in the dignity and the
autonomy of the individual. This is a traditionalist, client-centeredview of the lawyer's role in an
adversary system...." MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING

LAWYERS'

ETHICS, at vii (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE IV] (emphasis added).
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written on the subject-but I let it go at that. After all, he was a family
law teacher talking to students in one class, not someone who worked
and wrote in the field of lawyers' ethics.
What has motivated me to write now about client-centered
lawyering is a recent article by someone who is a serious scholar of
lawyers' ethics. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. is the co-author of an ethics
treatise and the Director of the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on
Law, Religion, and Ethics at Pepperdine University. 7 In his article,
Cochran correctly quoted me as saying:
One of the essential values of a just society is respect for the dignity of
each member of that society. Essential to each individual's dignity is
the free exercise of his autonomy. Toward that end, each person is
entitled to know his rights with respect to society and other individuals,
and to decide whether to seek fulfillment of those rights through the
due processes of law ....
[T]he attorney acts both professionally and morally in assisting clients
to maximize their autonomy .... [T]he attorney acts unprofessionally
and immorally by depriving clients of their autonomy, that is, by
denying them information regarding their legal rights, by otherwise
preempting their moral decisions,
8 or by depriving them of the ability to
carry out their lawful decisions.
The language in that quotation seems plain enough. The "free exercise"
of the client's autonomy is "essential." The lawyer is to "assist[] clients
to maximize their autonomy," and the lawyer acts "unprofessionally and
immorally" by "preempting [a client's] moral decisions."
In addition, in the same chapter of the book, I explained that "[i]n
day-to-day law practice, the most common instances of amoral or
immoral conduct by lawyers are those occasions in which we preempt
our clients' moral judgments." 9 One way that occurs is when lawyers
"assume that the client wants us to maximize [the client's] material or

7.

THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL

RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2009); Herbertand ElinorNootbaarInstitute on Law, Religion, and Ethics:
Meet the Faculty, PEPP. U. SCH. L., http://Iaw.pepperdine.edu/nootbaar/about/faculty.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2012).

8. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the Future of LawyerClient Relations, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 685, 687 (2011) (quoting MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 57 (1st ed. 1990)). See also FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE IV,
supra note 6, § 3.08, at 62-63; MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS § 3.08, at 62 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE III]; Monroe
H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1717, 1722, 1727
(2002).
9. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 51.
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tactical position in every way that is legally permissible, regardless of
non-legal considerations."'10 Another way is to go forward without
adequate consultation with the client about the client's desires. 1' I also
explain that a paramount aspect of client-centered lawyering is paying
close attention to what the client says, according respect to the client's
advising the client about the morality
desires, and, in appropriate cases,
12
of particular courses of conduct.
Despite that clear statement of my position regarding clientcentered lawyering, Cochran goes on to say that client-centered lawyers
claim to be neutral in counseling clients, but that, in fact, they "steer[]
the client toward making self-serving choices," and direct the client "to
make choices based on consequences to themselves" regardless of the
consequences to others.' 3 Cochran adds that "[o]f course, client
autonomy has its costs, most obviously costs to other people, and to their
relationships., 14 That, of course, is not a fair summary of my view of
client-centered lawyering.
Moreover, one would expect that a scholar in the field would refer
to the latest (here, the fourth) edition of a book, rather than rely solely on
a first edition that is twenty-one years out-of-date. If Cochran had done
so, he would also have realized that his claim is false that "clientcentered [lawyers] claim to be neutral" in counseling clients. 5 In fact,
there are some circumstances in which client-centered lawyering does
include pressing the client forcefully to adopt a particular course of
conduct.
In a section devoted to analyzing some difficult cases in which
clients express desires to pursue self-destructive courses, Professor
Smith and I discuss cases (none of them involving harm to others) in
which we would press clients hard to adopt different courses of conduct
from those they expressly prefer.' 6 These cases include the Unabomber
case.' 7 There, the defendant, Theodore Kaczynski, was charged with
"capital murder arising out of his campaign against 'technology,' which
he carried out by sending bombs through the mail to various academics
and scientists."' 8 The problem faced by Kaczynski's lawyers was that
their client preferred to be executed rather than to defend the case with
10.

Id.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at50-57.
Cochran, supranote 8, at 688.
Id.
Id.
FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE IV, supranote 6, § 3.07, at 58-60.
Id. § 3.07, at 58. See also FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE III, supra note 8, § 3.07, at 59-61.
FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE IV, supra note 6, § 3.07, at 59.
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an insanity defense-a defense that, in his view, would have undercut
his message about the evils of technology. 19 As Smith and I explain, this
is a case that poses a painful dilemma for client-centered lawyers who
oppose the death penalty. 20 "Our view is that someone ought to be
representing the client's desires. The problem, however, is that important
facts and legal issues may never be 21presented to the fact-finder,
potentially resulting in the client's death."
Far from remaining neutral, Professor Smith and I write that "we
would have pressed Kaczynski hard to pursue the legal strategy" that
would save his life.22 In the final analysis, however, after exploring
various alternatives, Smith and I disagree. As we explain, Smith believes
that "no reasonable criminal defense lawyer would do what Kaczynski
wanted-forgo the only defense that might save his life. ' 23 However,
Smith would also seek appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
the client's desires.2 4 My position is that "Kaczynski was not urging an
indefensible position, in view of Kaczynski's deeply held ideology, and
[that] his impassioned commitment to his cause was entitled to
deference., 25 Whatever Cochran might make of that discussion, the
counseling at issue is not neutral. And I can't help wondering what
Cochran himself, or you, Thoughtful Reader, would do in a case like
that.
Finally, Cochran expresses his own "Collaborative Lawyering"
view-which is difficult to distinguish from my own client-centered
position. In his view, Cochran writes, "the relationship between lawyer
and client should be a collaborative one.... Lawyers should advise
clients about moral issues that arise in representation in the way that
friends advise friends, raising such issues for serious discussion, but not
imposing their will on the client. 26 The collaborative lawyer, he
explains, "engages in moral conversation with the client but generally
leaves decisions to the client., 27 Interestingly, Cochran never explains
what he means by "generally" leaving decisions to the client, although
the implication is that at least on some occasions, he would impose his
will on an unwilling client.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 3.07, at 60.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 3.07, at 61 n.80.
24. Id.§ 3.07, at 61.
25. Id.§3.07, at 61 n.80.
26. Cochran, supra note 8, at 690.
27. Id. at 691. Oddly, Cochran criticizes me for saying that I would follow the client's
instructions if the client rejected my advice. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 7, at 26.
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In a final misunderstanding of client-centered lawyering, Cochran
writes:
One of the best ways to raise moral concerns in the law office is by
asking questions which come naturally in the course of decisionmaking. As to each alternative under consideration, the lawyer can ask
the client, "What will be its effect on other people?" The lawyer and
client should consider all of the consequences that might arise from
various alternatives, not (as with client-centered lawyers) merely the
consequences to the client. The lawyer might also ask, "What would be
fair?" Such questions call on clients to draw on their own sources of
moral values.
Except for the words in parentheses, that is a good summary of clientcentered lawyering. For example, there is an illustration in the current
edition of UnderstandingLawyers' Ethics of a conversation I had in a
law office, suggesting to a client that he might not want me to evict a
war widow with a young child, in accordance with his initial
instructions.29 Without undue pressure on my part, the client changed his
mind, and chose not to evict her.3 °
Ironically, Cochran and Shaffer have used that incident as an
illustration of moral counseling in their treatise. 31 Another case used by
Cochran and Shaffer to illustrate moral counseling is one in which a
contentious adversary, in proposing a redraft of a contract, made a
million-dollar-a-year error in my client's favor.32 Although my client's
first reaction was to take advantage of the error, I was able to persuade
him (again, without undue pressure) to reveal the error to the adversary,
in part because doing so might create a better relationship than had
previously existed between the parties.33
Client-centered lawyering is premised on respect for the dignity and
autonomy of each member of society. Clients are therefore entitled to
know their rights with respect to society and other individuals, and to
decide whether to seek fulfillment of those rights through the due
processes of law. Lawyers therefore act both professionally and morally
in assisting clients to maximize their autonomy. And lawyers act

28. Cochran, supra note 8, at 692.
29. FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE IV, supra note 6, at 74.
30. See id.
31. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 7, at 25. See also Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and
the Good Client, 36 CAT". U. L. REv. 319, 327 (1987).
32. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 7, at 25. See also Shaffer, supra note 31, at 327.
33. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 7, at 25-26. See also Shaffer, supra note 31,
at 327-28.
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unprofessionally and immorally in preempting or overriding their
clients' desires.
That obligation to maximize a client's desires cannot be fulfilled
without counseling the client, which includes paying close attention to
what the client says, and according respect to the client's desires. In
addition, in appropriate cases, client-centered lawyering includes the
lawyer's advice to the client of what the lawyer believes would be a
moral course of conduct to take. Nevertheless, "[i]n the final
analysis ...the lawyer should always remember that the decision
whether to [forgo] legally available objectives or methods because of
non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for [the lawyer]. 3 4
Professor Cochran can put that forth as "Collaborative Lawyering,"
but it has been, for decades, what is called client-centered lawyering.

34. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1986).
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